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Abstract
The efficient design of networks has been an important engineering task that involves challenging
combinatorial optimization problems. Typically, a network designer has to select among several alterna-
tives which links to establish so that the resulting network satisfies a given set of connectivity require-
ments and the cost of establishing the network links is as low as possible. The MINIMUM SPANNING
TREE problem, which is well-understood, is a nice example.
In this paper, we consider the natural scenario in which the connectivity requirements are posed by
selfish users who have agreed to share the cost of the network to be established according to a well-
defined rule. The design proposed by the network designer should now be consistent not only with the
connectivity requirements but also with the selfishness of the users. Essentially, the users are players in
a so-called network design game and the network designer has to propose a design that is an equilibrium
for this game. As it is usually the case when selfishness comes into play, such equilibria may be sub-
optimal. In this paper, we consider the following question: can the network designer enforce particular
designs as equilibria or guarantee that efficient designs are consistent with users’ selfishness by appro-
priately subsidizing some of the network links? In an attempt to understand this question, we formulate
corresponding optimization problems and present positive and negative results.
1 Introduction
Network design is a rich class of combinatorial optimization problems that model important engineering
questions arising in modern networks. In an ideal scenario, a network designer that acts on behalf of a
central authority is given an edge-weighted graph representing the potential links between nodes and their
operation cost, and connectivity requirements between the nodes. The objective of the network designer
is to compute a subgraph (the network to be established) of minimum cost that satisfies all connectivity
requirements. Depending on the structure of the connectivity requirements, this definition leads to many
optimization problems ranging from problems that are well-understood and efficiently solvable such as the
MINIMUM SPANNING TREE to problems whose optimal solutions are even hard to approximate.
In this paper, we consider the scenario in which users are selfish and have agreed to a well-defined rule
according to which they will share the cost of the network to be established. The connectivity requirements
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are now posed by the users; each user wishes to connect two specific nodes. A design should satisfy each
connectivity requirement through a path connecting these two nodes in the established network. According
to the particular cost sharing rule we consider, the corresponding user will then share the cost of each link in
her path with the other users that use this link. Even though the network designer can still resort to the rich
toolset of network design algorithms in order to propose a network of reasonable cost, this approach neglects
the selfish behavior of the users. A user may not be satisfied with the current design since a different path that
satisfies her connectivity requirement may cost her less. Then, she could unilaterally propose an alternative
path that possibly includes links that were not in the proposal of the network designer. Other users could
also act similarly and these negotiations compute the network to be established in a chaotic manner. The
role of the network designer is almost canceled and, furthermore, it is not clear when the selfish users will
reach an agreement (if they ever do) and, even if they do, whether this agreement will be really beneficial for
the users as a whole, i.e., whether the total (or social) cost of the established network will be reasonable. So,
the goal of the network designer is to propose a design (i.e., a network and, subsequently, a path to each user
and an associated cost) that not only meets the connectivity requirements of the users but is also consistent
with their selfish nature. Furthermore, since the network designer acts on behalf of the central authority, the
design should be efficient, i.e., the network to be established should have reasonable social cost. Essentially,
the users are engaged as players in a non-cooperative strategic game, called a network design game, and the
role of the network designer is to propose an efficient design that is an equilibrium of this game.
Typically, efficiency is not an easy goal when selfishness comes into play. This leads to the following
question which falls within one of the main lines of research in Algorithmic Game Theory: how is the social
cost affected by selfish behavior? The notion of the price of anarchy (introduced in the seminal paper of
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [27]; see also [32]) can quantify this relation. Expressed in the context
of a network design game, it would be defined as the ratio of the social cost of the worst possible Nash
equilibrium over the social cost of an optimal design. Hence, it is pessimistic in nature and (as its name
suggests) provides a worst-case guarantee for conditions of total anarchy. Instead, the notion of the price of
stability that was introduced by Anshelevich et al. [3] is optimistic in nature and quantifies how easy the job
of the network designer is. It is defined as the ratio of the social cost of the best equilibrium over the cost of
the optimal design and essentially asks: what is the best one can hope from a design given that the players
are selfish?
Unfortunately, the price of stability can be large which would mean that every design that is consistent
with selfishness has high social cost. The central authority could then intervene in order to mitigate the
impact of selfishness. One solution that seems natural would be to contribute to the social cost of the
network to be established by partially subsidizing some of the network links. According to this scenario,
the network designer has to compute a design and decide which links in the established network should be
subsidized by the central authority. The users will then share the unsubsidized portion of the cost of the
network links they use. Essentially, they will be involved in a new network design game and the goal of the
network designer should be to guarantee that the design and the subsidies computed induce an equilibrium
for this new game. Let us take this approach to its extreme in order to show that it is a feasible one. The
network designer simply computes a design of low social cost (ignoring the issue of selfishness) which is
fully subsidized by the central authority. The cost of each user is now zero and the design is obviously
consistent with their selfishness. The problem becomes non-trivial when the central authority runs on a
limited budget. What is the best design the network designer can guarantee given this budget? Alternatively,
what is the minimum amount of subsidies sufficient in order to achieve a given social cost? Can optimality
be achieved? Can the corresponding designs be computed efficiently?
Problem statement. In an attempt to understand these questions, we introduce and study two optimization
problems that arise in this context. Informally, they can be defined as follows. In STABLE NETWORK
ENFORCEMENT (SNE), we are given a network design game on a graph together with a particular target
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network T , and we wish to compute the minimum amount of subsidies that have to be put on the links of T
so that the design is acceptable to the users. In STABLE NETWORK DESIGN (SND), we are given a particular
budget together with the input game, and we wish to compute a network T that satisfies the connectivity
requirements and to assign an amount of subsidies to the links of T within the stipulated budget so that the
design is acceptable to the users. The objective is to minimize the social cost of T . Besides the standard
version of both problems, we also consider their all-or-nothing version in which a link can either be fully
subsidized or not subsidized at all.
Even though some of our results apply to general network design games, we have placed emphasis on
a special class of network design games, called broadcast games. In such a game, there is a special node
in the input graph called the root. There is one player associated with each distinct non-root node and her
connectivity requirement is a path from her associated node to the root. A nice property of such games is that
an optimal design is a solution of the MINIMUM SPANNING TREE problem on the input graph and can be
computed efficiently. Even in this seemingly simple case, as we will see, selfish behavior of players imposes
challenging restrictions. Furthermore, we consider network design games in undirected graphs. Note that
this strengthens our results since they can be adapted easily to network design games on directed graphs
and, furthermore, undirected network design games are less understood in terms of their price of stability
(see the discussion below).
Related work. Strategic games that arise from network design scenarios have received much attention in
the Algorithmic Game Theory literature. The first related paper is probably [4]. The particular network
design games that we consider in the current paper were introduced by Anshelevich et al. in [3]. An
important observation made there is that network design games admit a potential function that was proposed
by Rosenthal [33] for a broader class of games called congestion games. A potential function over all designs
has the property that the difference in the potential of two designs that differ in the strategy of a single player
equals the difference of the cost of that player in these designs; hence, a design that locally minimizes the
potential function is a Nash equilibrium. Using a simple but elegant argument, Anshelevich et al. [3] proved
that the price of stability is at most Hn, the n-th harmonic number, where n is the number of players. Their
proof considers a Nash equilibrium that can be reached from an optimal design when the players make
arbitrary selfish deviations. The main argument used is that the potential of the Nash equilibrium is strictly
smaller than that of the optimal design and the proof follows due to the fact that the potential function of
Rosenthal approximates the social cost of any design within a factor of at most Hn. Much of the subsequent
research on network design games has focused on providing tight bounds on the price of stability. The
Hn bound is known to be tight for directed networks only. For undirected networks, better bounds on the
price of stability of O(log log n) for broadcast games and O(log n/ log log n) for generalizations known as
multicast games are presented in [29] and [20], respectively. Still, the best lower bounds are only constant;
2.245 in general, 1.862 for multicast, and 1.818 for broadcast games [8]. The papers [13] and [12] provide
bounds on the quality of equilibria reached when players enter a multicast game one by one and play their
best response and then (when all players have arrived) they concurrently play until an equilibrium is reached.
They prove that the price of anarchy of the equilibria reached is at most polylogarithmic in the number of
players.
Another intriguing question is related to the complexity of computing equilibria in such games. In gen-
eral, the problem was recently proved to be PLS-hard [36]. The corresponding hardness reduction does not
apply to multicast or broadcast games. Unfortunately, the classical approach of minimizing the potential
function that has been proved useful in the case of network congestion games [18] cannot be applied to
multicast games; the authors of [13] prove that minimizing Rosenthal’s potential function is NP-hard. Fur-
thermore, as it is observed in [36], computing an equilibrium of minimum social cost in multicast games is
NP-hard. Approximate equilibria is the subject of the recent paper [2].
Monetary incentives in strategic games have been considered in many different contexts. Most of the
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work in Mechanism Design uses such incentives to motivate players to act truthfully (see [31] for an intro-
duction to the field). The (non-exhaustive) list also includes their use in Cooperative Game Theory in order
to encourage coalitions of players reach stability [6] and as a means to stabilize normal form games [30].
However, the particular use of monetary incentives in the current paper is substantially different and aims at
improving the performance of the system the game represents. In this direction, other tools have also been
considered recently. Besides their importance in creating income, the appropriate use of taxes can also im-
prove system efficiency. A series of recent papers [17, 11, 21, 25, 35] study the impact of taxes (or tolls) in
the efficiency of network routing (extending early developments in the literature of the Economics of Trans-
portation; see [17] and the references therein). Stackelberg strategies applied to routing [26], scheduling
[28, 34, 35], and, recently, network design games [19] aim to improve performance by introducing a set of
non-selfish leaders whose strategies are controlled by the system designer and aim to motivate selfish play-
ers to reach efficient equilibria. Coordination mechanisms (applied so far to scheduling in [5, 10, 16, 24])
aim to improve performance by introducing priorities among the players. An approach that is closer to ours
has been followed in [9] where subsidies are used in multicast games; unlike our approach, the subsidies are
collected as taxes from the players in order to guarantee efficient worst-case equilibria.
Overview of results and roadmap. In this paper we present the following results. First, we observe
that SNE can be solved in polynomial time using linear programming; this observation applies to general
instances of SNE. The linear program has an exponential number of constraints but can be solved using
the ellipsoid method. A reformulation based on standard techniques yields an LP of polynomial size. For
instances of SNE with broadcast games, we present a much simpler LP in which the number of variables
and constraints is linear and quadratic in the number of players, respectively. On the other hand, SND is
proved to be NP-hard even for broadcast instances. In particular, detecting whether a minimum spanning
tree can be enforced as an equilibrium without using any subsidies is NP-hard. This result implies that
detecting whether the price of stability of a given broadcast game is 1 or not is NP-hard. In this direction,
we have a stronger result: approximating the price of stability of a broadcast game is APX-hard. The last two
statements significantly extend the NP-hardness result of [36] and indicate that, besides the rough estimates
provided by the known bounds on the price of stability which hold for a broad class of games, the estimate
the network designer can make about the most efficient designs of a particular broadcast game will also be
rough. These results are presented in Section 3.
Next, we consider broadcast instances of SNE and the question of how much subsidies are sufficient and
necessary in order to enforce a given minimum spanning tree as an equilibrium. We show that this can be
done using a percentage of 37% of the weight of the minimum spanning tree as subsidies. The proof has two
main components. First, we show how to prove this upper bound by decomposing the game into subgames
with a significantly simpler structure than the original one. Second, in order to compute the subsidies in each
subgame, we use a virtual approximation of the cost experienced by the players on the links of the network.
We also demonstrate that our upper bound is tight: an amount of 37% of the minimum spanning tree weight
as subsidies may be necessary for some simple instances. These results are presented in Section 4.
Surprisingly, in contrast to the standard case, we prove that the all-or-nothing version of SNE is hard to
approximate within any factor even when restricted to instances with broadcast games. The corresponding
proof is long and technically involved and indicates that the only approximation guarantee should bound
the amount of subsidies as a constant fraction of the weight of the minimum spanning tree. Interestingly,
we prove that significantly more subsidies may be necessary compared to the standard version of SNE. In
particular, there are broadcast instances which require a percentage of 61% of the weight of the minimum
spanning tree as subsidies in order to enforce it as an equilibrium. These results are presented in Section 5.
We begin with preliminary definitions and notation in Section 2 and conclude with interesting open
problems in Section 6.
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2 Definitions and notation
A network design game consists of an edge-weighted undirected graph G = (V,E,w), a set N of n players,
and a source-destination pair of nodes (si, ti) for each player i. Each player wishes to connect her source to
her destination and, in order to do this, she can select as a strategy any path Ti connecting si to ti in G. The
tuple T = (T1, T2, ..., Tn) that consists of the strategies of the players (with one strategy per player) is called
a state. We say that player i uses edge a in T if her strategy Ti contains a. With some abuse in notation, we
also denote by T the set of edges included in strategies T1, T2, ..., Tn as well as the subgraph of G induced
by these edges. We say that an edge a ∈ E is established if at least one player uses edge a. Consider such
an edge a and let na(T ) be the number of players whose strategies in T contain a. Throughout the paper,
we also use the notation nia(T ) to denote whether player i uses edge a (nia(T ) = 1) or not (nia(T ) = 0).
Each player i in N experiences a cost of costi(T ) =
∑
a∈Ti
wa
na(T )
, i.e., the weight of each established edge
is shared as cost among the players using it.
The state T is called a (pure Nash) equilibrium if no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from
T in order to decrease her cost, i.e., for each player i and possible strategy T ′i that connects the source-
destination pair (si, ti) in G, it holds that costi(T ) ≤ costi(T−i, T ′i ). The notation T−i, T ′i denotes the
state in which player i uses strategy T ′i and the remaining players use their strategies in T . Throughout
the paper, we denote by wgt(A) the total weight of the set of edges A in G, i.e., wgt(A) =
∑
a∈A wa.
The quality of a state is measured by the total weight of the established edges. Since the weight of each
established edge is shared as cost among the players that use it, the quality of a state coincides with the total
cost experienced by all players, i.e., wgt(T ) =
∑
i costi(T ). The price of stability of a network design
game is simply the ratio of the weight of the edges established in the best equilibrium over the optimal cost
among all states of the game.
Given an edge-weighted graph G = (V,E,w), a subsidy assignment b is a function that assigns a
subsidy ba ∈ [0, wa] to each edge a ∈ E. The cost of a subsidy assignment is simply the sum of the
subsidies on all edges of G, i.e.,
∑
a∈E ba. We use the term all-or-nothing to refer to subsidies that are
constrained so that ba ∈ {0, wa} for each edge a ∈ E. Given a set of edges A in G, we use the notation
b(A) in order to refer to the total amount of subsidies assigned to the edges of A in the subsidy assignment
b, i.e., b(A) =
∑
a∈A ba. We refer to b(E) as the cost of the subsidy assignment b. Given a network design
game on a graph G and a subsidy assignment b on the edges of G, we use the term extension of the original
game with subsidies b in order to refer to the network design game on graph G (with the same players and
strategy sets as in the original game) with the only difference being that the cost of a player at a state T
is now costi(T ; b) =
∑
a∈Ti
wa−ba
na(T )
. When a particular state T is an equilibrium of the extension of the
original game with subsidies b, we say that the subsidy assignment b enforces T as an equilibrium in the
extension of the original game.
An instance of the STABLE NETWORK DESIGN problem (SND) consists of a network design game on
a graph G, a budget B, and a positive number K . The question is whether there exists a subsidy assignment
b of cost at most B on the edges of G so that a subgraph of G of total weight at most K is an equilibrium for
the extension of the original game with subsidies b. An instance of the STABLE NETWORK ENFORCEMENT
problem (SNE) consists of a network design game on a graph G, a budget B, and a state T . The question
is whether there exists a subsidy assignment of cost at most B on the edges of G so that b enforces T as
an equilibrium on the extension of the original game with subsidies b. Note that the subsidy assignment
does not need to put any subsidies to edges not in T . In the integral versions of SNE and SND, the subsidy
assignment in question is all-or-nothing. Of course, optimization versions of the above problems are natural.
For example, in an optimization version of SNE, we are given the network design game on a graph G and a
state T , and we require the subsidy assignment in question to be of minimum cost.
Broadcast games are special cases of network design games. In a broadcast game, the graph G has
exactly n + 1 nodes; all players have the same destination node, which is called the root and is denoted by
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r, and distinct non-root nodes as sources. In such games, we refer to a player with a source node u as the
player associated with node u (and use u to identify the player). Clearly, any state T in such a game spans all
nodes of G and a minimum spanning tree is a state that minimizes the total cost experienced by the players.
Given any spanning tree T and a non-root node u, we denote by Tu the path from u to r in T . In broadcast
games, we mostly consider equilibria that are spanning trees. It can be easily seen that if an equilibrium T
contains a cycle, then all edges in this cycle must have zero weight; then, there is an alternative spanning
tree with the same total weight that is also an equilibrium.
3 The complexity of SNE and SND
We begin the presentation of our results with the following observation.
Theorem 1 STABLE NETWORK ENFORCEMENT is in P.
This theorem applies to general instances of SNE. By slightly deviating from the main focus of the paper
which is on broadcast games, we first discuss how general instances of SNE can be expressed using linear
programming; analogous formulations have been proposed for the computation of tolls in non-atomic selfish
routing games (e.g., see [21]). Then, specifically for broadcast SNE instances, we present a much simpler
LP formulation.
We will describe a linear program which, given a network design game with a set N of n players on
an edge-weighted graph G = (V,E,w) and a state T , solves the optimization version of the problem by
computing a subsidy assignment b of minimum cost so that T is an equilibrium of the extension of the
original game on G with subsidies b. The subsidies in question are the variables of the LP. We remark that,
even though we only need to use variables for the subsidies on the edges of T , we assume that ba is defined
for each edge a of E in order to simplify the presentation; it should be clear that, in any optimal solution
of the linear programs below, ba = 0 for each edge a ∈ E \ T . The variables are constrained so that
ba ∈ [0, wa] while there are constraints that capture the requirement that T is an equilibrium in the extension
of the original game with subsidies b. For each player i, this means that the cost the player experiences in
T should not be higher than the cost she would experience when deviating to any other strategy T ′i (i.e., a
path that connects her source node si to her destination ti). This is captured by the inequality in the second
line of LP (1), where Ti denotes the set of all paths connecting node si to node ti in G. The left hand
side of the inequality is simply the cost costi(T ; b) of player i in T while the right hand side is the cost
costi(T−i, T
′
i ; b) she would experience in state T−i, T ′i . Observe that the denominator na(T ) + 1− nia(T )
equals the number of players using edge a in T−i, T ′i . Also note that, given T and i, the quantities na(T )
and nia(T ) are fixed and, clearly, all constraints are linear.
minimize
∑
a∈E
ba (1)
subject to ∀i ∈ N,T ′i ∈ Ti,
∑
a∈Ti
wa − ba
na(T )
≤
∑
a∈T ′
i
wa − ba
na(T ) + 1− nia(T )
∀a ∈ E, 0 ≤ ba ≤ wa
In general, the above LP has an exponential number of constraints (one for each player i and each path in Ti)
but can be solved in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method (see [23]). All that is needed is a separation
oracle which returns a violating constraint (if one exists) for a given subsidy assignment b in polynomial
time. We demonstrate how this can be done for the constraints associated with player i. We construct an
edge-weighted graph Hi over the set of nodes V (and set of edges E) so that the weight of edge a is defined
as w′a =
wa−ba
na(T )+1−nia(T )
. We compute a shortest path pi from node si to node ti in Hi. If the length of
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path pi satisfies
∑
a∈pi w
′
a < costi(T ; b), then the constraint that is associated with path pi for player i is
violated. Otherwise, no constraint associated with player i is violated.
We can transform the above LP to an equivalent one that has polynomial size. The main idea is to
simulate the separation oracle for the above LP using additional variables and constraints. For each player i
and node v of G, we introduce the variable πi(v) to denote a lower bound on the length of the shortest path
in graph Hi from node si to node v. The first two lines in the constraints of the following LP guarantee that
πi(v) is indeed such a lower bound (in the first constraint, Γ(u) denotes the set of neighbors of node u in
G). Then, the constraint πi(ti) ≥ costi(T ; b) guarantees that the player i has no incentive to deviate from
her strategy in T in the extension of the original game with subsidies b.
minimize
∑
a∈E
ba (2)
subject to ∀i ∈ N,u ∈ V, v ∈ Γ(u), πi(v) ≤ πi(u) +
w(u,v) − b(u,v)
n(u,v)(T ) + 1− n
i
(u,v)(T )
∀i ∈ N,πi(si) = 0
∀i ∈ N,πi(ti) ≥
∑
a∈Ti
wa − ba
na(T )
∀i ∈ N,u ∈ V \ {si}, πi(u) ≥ 0
∀a ∈ E, 0 ≤ ba ≤ wa
LP (2) has Θ(n|V |) variables and Θ(n|E|) constraints. We have a much simpler LP when the input is an
instance of SNE consisting of a broadcast game on graph G (with a root node r) and a spanning tree T of G.
We use the same variables as in the original LP (i.e., n variables since T is a spanning tree over n+1 nodes
now) and much fewer (i.e., O(|E|)) constraints. In particular, we just require that no player associated with
a node u has an incentive to change her strategy in T and use an edge (u, v) that does not belong to T and
the path from v to r in T . The corresponding LP is:
minimize
∑
a∈E
ba (3)
subject to ∀u ∈ V \ {r}, v ∈ Γ(u) such that (u, v) 6∈ T ,∑
a∈Tu
wa − ba
na(T )
≤ w(u,v) +
∑
a∈Tv
wa − ba
na(T ) + 1− nua(T )
∀a ∈ E, 0 ≤ ba ≤ wa
The correctness of the above LP (i.e., its equivalence with the optimization version of SNE) is given by the
following lemma.
Lemma 2 Consider an instance of STABLE NETWORK ENFORCEMENT consisting of a broadcast game
on a graph G and a state T . A subsidy assignment b enforces T as an equilibrium in the extension of the
broadcast game in G if and only if the constraints of LP (3) are satisfied.
Proof. If T is an equilibrium of the extension of the broadcast game on G with subsidies b, then clearly the
constraints of LP (3) are satisfied since otherwise a player associated with node u would have an incentive
to deviate and use the path that consists of the edge from u to another node v that is not part of T and the
path from v to r in T (or, simply, of the direct edge from u to the root node if v = r).
Now, assume that all constraints of LP (3) are satisfied for a subsidy assignment b. We will show that no
player has an incentive to deviate from T in the extension of the broadcast game with subsidies b. Assume
for the sake of contradiction that the player associated with node u has an incentive to deviate to some path
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from u to r that includes edges not belonging to T . Among such paths, let p be the path that incurs the
minimum cost for the player associated with node u and, furthermore, contains the minimum number of
edges not belonging to T . Following the edges of path p from node u to node r, let (v1, v2) be its last edge
that does not belong to T . Using the constraint of the LP for the player associated with node v1 and edge
(v1, v2), we have that
∑
a∈Tv1
wa − ba
na(T )
≤ w(v1,v2) +
∑
a∈Tv2
wa − ba
na(T ) + 1− n
v1
a (T )
.
Also, let v3 be the least common ancestor of v1 and v2 in T and denote by q1 and q2 the subpaths of Tv1 and
Tv2 that connect v1 and v2 to v3, respectively. Since Tv1 and Tv2 use the same edges in order to connect v3
to r and q1 and q2 are edge-disjoint (and, hence, nv1a (T ) = 0 for each a ∈ q2), we also have that
∑
a∈q1
wa − ba
na(T )
≤ w(v1,v2) +
∑
a∈q2
wa − ba
na(T ) + 1
. (4)
Now, observe that the cost experienced by player u when deviating to the path p is strictly smaller than the
cost she would experience by using the path p′ consisting of the subpath of p connecting u to v1, the edges
of q1, and the edges of p from v3 to r. Otherwise, the path p′ would either incur strictly smaller cost to the
player associated with node u than p or it would also incur the same cost as p but it would have strictly fewer
edges not belonging to T ; both cases contradict our assumptions about p. Hence,
w(v1,v2) +
∑
a∈q2
wa − ba
na(T ) + 1− nua(T )
<
∑
a∈q1
wa − ba
na(T ) + 1− nua(T )
,
which implies that
w(v1,v2) +
∑
a∈q2
wa − ba
na(T ) + 1
<
∑
a∈q1
wa − ba
na(T )
, (5)
since nua(T ) ∈ {0, 1}. We have reached a contradiction between (4) and (5) and the lemma follows.
Next, we prove that the restriction of SND to broadcast instances is NP-hard. The hardness proof
uses instances of SND with budget equal to zero with target equilibrium weight equal to the weight of
the minimum spanning tree. Note that in instances with a unique minimum spanning tree, the problem is
certainly in P; one can just compute a minimum spanning tree and apply the LP approach described above.
In our reduction, there are many different minimum spanning trees but it is hard to detect whether there is
one that is an equilibrium in the corresponding broadcast game.
Theorem 3 Given an instance of STABLE NETWORK DESIGN consisting of a broadcast game on a graph
G, budget B, and a positive number K , it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists a subsidy assignment
b of cost at most B so that the extension of the game with subsidies b has a tree of weight at most K as an
equilibrium. Moreover, it is NP-hard even when B is set to zero.
We will first describe a gadget that is used in the proof of Theorem 3; we call it the Bypass gadget of
capacity κ. The gadget is shown in Figure 1. Let ℓ be the minimum positive integer such that Hκ+ℓ−Hκ > 1.
The Bypass gadget consists of a root node r connected to one end of a path of ℓ nodes formed with edges
of unit weight. We call this the basic path of the Bypass gadget. The node c on the far end of the path
from r is called the connector node. There is an edge from c to r of weight Hκ+ℓ −Hκ, which we call the
bypass edge.
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Suppose this gadget is connected to a subgraph S of β nodes as shown in Figure 1. For the moment,
we are not concerned with how the nodes in S are connected to each other. Consider the instance of SNE
consisting of the broadcast game on the graph G of Figure 1, budget B = 0, and let T be a minimum
spanning tree of G. Note that T does not include the bypass edge; it includes all edges in the basic path
from c to r instead.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
β nodes
ℓ nodes
c root r
Hκ+ℓ −Hκ > 1
bypass edge
Subgraph S
Figure 1: The Bypass gadget with capacity κ.
Lemma 4 If β < κ, then the player associated with node c has an incentive to deviate from her strategy in
T and use the bypass edge. Otherwise, no player associated with a node in the basic path has any incentive
to deviate from T .
Proof. Regardless of how the players associated with nodes in the subgraph S are routed, since S is con-
nected to the Bypass gadget through node c, there are β+1 players that need to use a path from c to r. Let
us focus on the player associated with node c. If she and all the β players from S take the basic path, then
her cost will be
∑ℓ
i=1
1
β+i = Hβ+ℓ − Hβ. If β < κ, then Hκ+ℓ − Hκ < Hβ+ℓ − Hβ , and therefore, the
player associated with node c has an incentive to deviate to the bypass edge. On the other hand, if β ≥ κ,
then Hκ+ℓ −Hκ ≥ Hβ+ℓ −Hβ and any player associated with a node in the basic path experiences a cost
of at most Hβ+ℓ −Hβ in T . Hence, no such player has an incentive to deviate from T .
Proof of Theorem 3. We show that the problem is NP-hard even when we consider the special case where
B = 0 and K equals the weight of the minimum spanning tree of the input graph G. In other words, given
a broadcast game on a graph G with root node r, we ask: does this game have a minimum spanning tree of
G as an equilibrium? We use a reduction from BIN PACKING.
We use a stricter form of BIN PACKING defined as follows. We are given a set of n items indexed by
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The size of each item i is a positive even integer denoted by si. Since bin packing is
strongly NP-hard [22], we assume that si is bounded by a polynomial in n. We are also given a set of k
bins indexed by j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, each of even integer capacity C , which we assume to be at least as large
as maxi si. We furthermore assume that
∑n
i=1 si = kC . We ask whether each item can be allocated to
one of the k bins so that the total size of items in each bin is exactly C . Our definition of BIN PACKING
is somewhat stricter than the conventional definition in which the capacity of bins and the size of the items
is not restricted to be even and bins are not required to be filled to the brim. However, we note that it is
quite straightforward to see that this restricted version of the problem can be reduced from the conventional
version by first adding a suitable number of unit-sized items and then doubling the size of all items and
the capacity of all bins. The number of additional items is upper-bounded by the total capacity of the bins.
Therefore, our restriction of BIN PACKING is also strongly NP-hard.
Given a restricted instance of BIN PACKING, we now construct an instance of SNE as follows. For each
item i of size si, we create a star graph with one center node which we denote by xi and si − 1 leaves.
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rc1 c2 c3 ck−1 ck
s1 − 1
s2 − 1 s3 − 1 sn−1 − 1 sn − 1
Edge weights 0
Edges in this level have
weight 2(HC+ℓ −HC)
Connector
nodes
x1 x2 x3 xn−1 xn
Bypass gadgets
of capacity C
Figure 2: The graph G constructed from an instance of BIN PACKING.
The edges connecting the leaves to the center node of the star have zero weight. Let X be the set of center
nodes. For each bin j, construct a Bypass gadget with capacity κ = C . Again, let ℓ be the number of
unit-weight edges in the basic path of each Bypass gadget. Recall that ℓ is the minimum positive integer
such that HC+ℓ − HC > 1; this implies that ℓ is linear in C . We denote the connector node in the gadget
corresponding to bin j by cj . Let χ be the set of all connector nodes. We connect sets χ and X by a
complete bipartite edge set with edges having weight 2(HC+ℓ−HC). Observe that any minimum spanning
tree of G consists of the kℓ unit-weight edges in the Bypass gadgets, the zero-weight edges connecting
the leaves to their star center, and n edges that connect nodes of χ to nodes of X so that each node of
X is connected to exactly one node of χ. We set K to be the weight of the minimum spanning tree, i.e.,
K = kℓ+ 2n(HC+ℓ −HC).
We claim that a minimum spanning tree Tne of G is an equilibrium for the broadcast game on G if and
only if the BIN PACKING instance has a solution. We prove this claim in both directions.
Let Tne be a minimum spanning tree that is an equilibrium. Let βj + 1 be the number of nodes in the
subtree of Tne rooted at cj . From Lemma 4, we know that since Tne is an equilibrium, for all j, it holds that
βj ≥ C . However, we also know from the properties of the BIN PACKING instance and the construction
of graph G that
∑k
j=1 βj =
∑n
i=1 si = kC . Clearly, it follows that for all j, we have βj = C . Therefore,
the allocation of item i to bin j whenever xi is connected to cj will lead to a solution for the BIN PACKING
instance since the total size of these items is exactly βj = C .
To show the other direction, let us suppose that we have a solution to the BIN PACKING instance.
We construct a minimum spanning tree Tne as follows. Tne contains the edges from the leaves to the
corresponding star center, the basic paths from the connector nodes to the root node r, and the edge (xi, cj)
for each item i that is allocated to bin j. Note that, for j = 1, ..., k, the number of nodes in the subtree of
Tne rooted at cj is exactly C . So, any player associated with a node in a basic path experiences a cost of at
most HC+ℓ − HC in Tne. Furthermore, observe that each edge of Tne between nodes of χ and X is used
by at least two players in Tne. So, any player associated with a node in a star experiences a cost of at least
2(HC+ℓ − HC). Hence, no player has an incentive to deviate to a path that includes a node of χ that she
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does not use in Tne. Any such path would include an edge of weight 2(HC+ℓ − HC) between a node in χ
and a node in X that is used only by that player. So, for each j, the C players associated with nodes in the
subtree of cj in Tne have no incentive to deviate to a path that does not use node cj . By Lemma 4, player
cj (and, consequently, all players that have node cj in their path to r in Tne) has no incentive to deviate to
the bypass edge connecting cj to r. This holds for any other node in the basic path of a Bypass gadget as
well. Therefore, it follows that Tne is an equilibrium.
Note that the proof of Theorem 3 essentially implies that deciding whether the price of stability of a
given broadcast game is 1 or not is NP-hard. The next statement provides an even stronger negative result.
It implies that given instances of SND consisting of a broadcast game on a graph G and a budget B, it is
NP-hard to approximate within a factor better than 571/570 the minimum weight among all equilibria in
any extension of the original game with subsidies of cost at most B.
Theorem 5 Approximating the price of stability of a broadcast game within a factor better than 571/570 is
NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is based on a reduction from INDEPENDENT SET in 3-regular graphs and uses an inap-
proximability result due to Berman and Karpinski [7]. Given a 3-regular graph H with n nodes and 3n/2
edges, we construct an instance of a broadcast game consisting of a graph G as follows. The graph G has a
node for each node and each edge of H and an additional root-node r. We denote by U the set of nodes of
G that correspond to a node of H and by V the set of nodes of G that correspond to an edge of H . For each
non-root node of G, there is an edge connecting it with the root; these edges have unit weight. A node of
V that corresponds to an edge (u, v) in H is connected with edges to the nodes of U that correspond to the
nodes u and v of H . The weight of these edges is 2+δ3 for some δ ∈ (0, 1/12]. Clearly, the subgraph of G
induced by the nodes in U ∪ V (i.e., all nodes besides r) is bipartite; in this subgraph, the nodes of U have
degree 3 while the nodes of V have degree 2.
We claim that the graph H has an independent set of size m if and only if the broadcast game has an
equilibrium of weight 5n/2 − (1− δ)m. Consider a spanning tree T of G and let F be the forest obtained
by removing the edges of T that are adjacent to r. We call a branch of T any subgraph consisting of a
connected component of F , the edge connecting a node of this connected component to r in T , and r itself.
For any spanning tree of G, each of its branches can belong to one of the following types (see Figure 3):
• Type A: It consists of a single edge connecting the root to a node in U ∪ V (see Figure 3a).
• Type B: It consists of an edge connecting the root to a node in U which in turn is connected with its
three adjacent nodes of V (see Figure 3b).
• Type C: It consists of an edge connecting the root to a node in U ∪V which is connected to either one
or two of its adjacent nodes in G (see Figure 3c).
• Type D: It is a tree of depth exactly 3 rooted at r (see Figures 3d and 3e).
• Type E: It is a tree of depth at least 4 rooted at r (see Figures 3f and 3g).
We will first prove that if T is an equilibrium for the broadcast game in G, then it has a very special
structure. In particular, none of its branches rooted at r can be of type C , D, or E. Assume otherwise and
let h be such a branch:
• If h is of type C, consider a leaf u of h. The first edge in the path from u to r in h (i.e., the one
adjacent to u) is not used by any other player besides the one associated with node u while the second
edge of the path is used by at most 3 players (i.e., the players associated with the leaves and the player
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g)
Figure 3: Examples with branches considered in the proof of Theorem 5. Black and white nodes denote
nodes of U and V , respectively while the grey nodes represent the root r. (a) A branch of type A. (b) A
branch of type B. (c) A branch of type C. (d) and (e) Branches of type D. (f) and (g) Branches of type E.
associated with the node of h which is connected with r). Thus, the cost player u experiences is at
least 2+δ3 + 1/3 > 1 and, hence, this player has an incentive to change her strategy and use the direct
edge from u to r. See Figure 3c for an example.
• If h is of type D, then it has at most 7 non-root nodes. Consider a leaf u that is at distance 3 from r.
If u belongs to U , then its adjacent node in h has degree 2. Thus, the first edge of the path from u to
r in h is not used by any other player besides the one associated with u while the second edge in the
path is used by at most 2 players. In total, the cost the player associated with node u experiences in
these two edges of the path is 2+δ3 +
2+δ
6 > 1 and, hence, this player has an incentive to change her
strategy and use the direct edge from u to r (see Figure 3d). If u belongs to V , its adjacent node in h
belongs to U and the next node in the path from u to r belongs to V . Thus, the first edge of the path
from u to r in h is not used by any other player besides the one associated with u, the second edge in
the path is used by at most 3 players, and the third edge in the path (the one adjacent to r) is used by
at most 7 players. In total, the cost the player associated with node u experiences in these three edges
of the path is 2+δ3 +
2+δ
9 +1/7 > 1 and, hence, this player has an incentive to change her strategy and
use the direct edge from u to r (see Figure 3e).
• If h is of type E, consider a leaf u that is at maximum distance (i.e., at least 4) from r. If u belongs
to U , then its adjacent node in h has degree 2. Thus, the first edge of the path from u to r in h is not
used by any other player besides the one associated with u while the second edge in the path is used
by at most 2 players. In total, the cost the player associated with node u experiences in these two
edges of the path is 2+δ3 +
2+δ
6 > 1 and, hence, this player has an incentive to change her strategy and
use the direct edge from u to r (see Figure 3f). If u belongs to V , its next two nodes in the path from
u to r in h belong to U and V , respectively. Thus, the first edge of the path from u to r in h is not
used by any other player besides the one associated with u, the second edge in the path is used by at
most 3 players, and the third edge in the path is used by at most 4 players. In total, the cost the player
associated with node u experiences in these three edges of the path is at least 2+δ3 +
2+δ
9 +
2+δ
12 > 1
and, hence, this player has an incentive to change her strategy and use the direct edge from u to r as
well (see Figure 3g).
Instead, if T consists only of branches of types A and B, no player has an incentive to deviate. Indeed,
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assume that a player associated with a node u in a branch h1 has an incentive to change her strategy and use
a new path. Note that the cost she experiences on the edges of h1 she uses is at most 1. Clearly, her new path
cannot include an edge incident to the root which does not belong to any branch since the cost experienced
in such a path would be at least 1. So, assume that the new path of the player contains the edges of another
branch h2 in order to connect u to r. Clearly, this path should contain an edge of G that is not contained in
any branches (and, hence, it is not used by any player besides the one associated with node u) while the first
edge of branch h2 that the path contains is used by exactly one player besides the one associated with node
u; this follows by the structure of G and by the fact that branches of T are of type A or B (and, hence, the
new path enters branch h2 through one of its leaves). Thus, the cost the player experiences in the new path
is at least 2+δ3 +
2+δ
6 > 1 and, hence, she has no incentive to deviate.
Now, consider a spanning tree T that is an equilibrium for the broadcast game in G and let m be the
number of branches of type B it contains. Clearly, the weight of the edges in such a branch is 3+ δ while the
total weight of the edges in branches of type A equals the number of nodes in U ∪ V which do not belong
to branches of type B, i.e., 5n/2 − 4m. Therefore, the total weight of the edges of T is 5n/2 − (1 − δ)m.
Let I be the set of nodes of H which correspond to the nodes of the branches of type B that are connected
to r in T . Due to the structure of G and T , I is an independent set of H with size m. Also, consider any
independent set in H with size m. We can conversely construct a spanning tree of G which consists of
branches of type A and B and, hence, is an equilibrium: for each node of U corresponding to a node in I ,
we create a branch of type B by connecting this node to r and to its three adjacent nodes in V . In this way,
we create m branches of type B. Also, we create 5n/2 − 4m branches of type A by connecting each node
of U ∪ V that does not participate in branches of type B to the root through their direct edges. The cost of
this equilibrium tree is again 5n/2− (1− δ)m.
Now, we use the inapproximability result due to Berman and Karpinski [7]. Their result can be thought
of as a polynomial-time reduction from the decision version of SATISFIABILITY. The reduction uses a
constant ǫ ∈ (0, 1/2). Given an instance φ of SATISFIABILITY, they construct an instance of INDEPENDENT
SET which consists of a 3-regular graph H with 284k nodes (for some parameter k) such that
• H has an independent set of size at least (140 − ǫ)k if φ is satisfiable, and
• H has no independent set of size more than (139 + ǫ)k if φ is not satisfiable.
Using the particular graphs as input to our reduction, we can view it as a reduction from SATISFIABILITY
as well. Given an instance φ of SATISFIABILITY, our reduction defines a broadcast game such that
• there exists an equilibrium of total weight at most 570 + 140δ + (1− δ)ǫ if φ is satisfiable, and
• there exists no equilibrium of total weight less than 571 + 139δ − (1− δ)ǫ if φ is not satisfiable.
By selecting ǫ and δ to be arbitrarily small, we conclude that approximating the minimum total weight
among all equilibria (and, hence, the price of stability) within a factor better than 571/570 is NP-hard.
4 Bounds on the amount of subsidies
In this section, we provide tight bounds on the amount of subsidies sufficient in order to enforce a minimum
spanning tree as an equilibrium in the extension of the original broadcast game. The result is expressed as
a constant fraction of the weight of the minimum spanning tree. We first prove our upper bound which is
more involved. The proof uses two key ideas: first, the input SNE instance is appropriately decomposed
into subinstances of SNE which have a significantly simpler structure. Our decomposition is such that the
desired bound has to be proved for the subinstances; in order to do so, we use a second idea and exploit
a virtual cost function that upper-bounds the actual cost experienced by the players in the extension of the
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game (in the subinstances) with subsidies. The main property of this virtual cost function that simplifies the
analysis considerably is that the total amount of subsidies necessary depends only on the weight of the tree
(and not on its structure).
Theorem 6 Given an instance of STABLE NETWORK ENFORCEMENT consisting of a broadcast game on
a graph G and a minimum spanning tree T of G, there is a subsidy assignment b of cost at most wgt(T )/e
that enforces T as an equilibrium of the extension of the game with subsidies b, where e is the basis of the
natural logarithm.
Proof. We decompose the graph G into copies G1, G2, ..., Gk so that the following properties hold:
• Gj has the same set of nodes and set of edges with G.
• The edge weights in Gj belong to {0, cj} for some cj > 0.
• If the weight of an edge a in Gj is non-zero, then the weight of a is non-zero in each of the copies
G1, ..., Gj−1 of G.
• The weight of each edge in G is equal to the sum of its weights in the copies of G.
The decomposition proceeds as follows. Let c1 be the minimum non-zero weight among the edges of G.
We construct a copy G1 of G (i.e., with the same set of nodes and set of edges) and with edge weights equal
to zero if the corresponding edge of G has zero weight and equal to c1 otherwise. Then, we decrease each
non-zero edge weight by c1 in G and proceed in the same way with the definition of the edge weights in the
copy G2, and so on. We denote by k the number of copies of G that have some edge of non-zero weight.
Note that ck may be infinite if G contains edges of infinite weight, but k is upper bounded by the number of
edges in G. Clearly, the weight of an edge in the original graph is the sum of its weights in the copies of G.
We denote by T j the spanning tree of Gj that has the same set of edges with T . We first observe that
T j is a minimum spanning tree of Gj . Assume that this is not the case; then, there must be an edge a1
with zero weight in Gj that does not belong to T j such that some edge a2 of the edges of T j with which a1
forms a cycle has non-zero weight cj . By the definition of our decomposition phase, this implies that a2 has
higher weight than a1 in G. This means that we could remove a2 from T and include a1 in order to obtain a
spanning tree with strictly smaller weight, i.e., T would not be a minimum spanning tree.
Now, in order to compute the desired subsidy assignment that enforces T as an equilibrium in the
extension of the broadcast game in G, we will exploit appropriate subsidy assignments for the broadcast
games in each copy of G. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Let cj > 0. Consider a broadcast game on a graph Gj whose edges have weights in {0, cj} and
let T j be a minimum spanning tree of Gj . Then, there is a subsidy assignment bj of cost at most wgt(T j)/e
that enforces T j as an equilibrium in the extension of the game with subsidies bj .
Proof. We call edges of weight 0 and cj light and heavy edges, respectively. We also call a player associated
with a node v a light player if the weight of the edge connecting v to its parent in T j is zero; otherwise,
we call v a heavy player. We denote by ma the number of heavy players which use edge a. Clearly,
ma ≤ na(T
j).
We will introduce a virtual cost associated with each edge of T j in order to upper-bound the contribution
of the edge to the real cost experienced by each player that uses the edge in T j in the extension of the game
with subsidies. In particular, given subsidies ya assigned to the heavy edge a with ya ∈ [0, cj ], we define
the virtual cost of edge a as vc(a, ya) = cj ln mama−1+ya/cj . The virtual cost of a light edge is always zero;
observe that no subsidies have to be assigned to these edges.
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Claim 8 For any heavy edge a with subsidies ya, it holds that vc(a, ya) ≥ cj−yana(T j) .
Proof. We use the inequality lnx ≤ x− 1 for x ∈ [0, 1]. We have
vc(a, ya) = cj ln
ma
ma − 1 + ya/cj
= −cj ln
(
1−
cj − ya
macj
)
≥
cj − ya
ma
≥
cj − ya
na(T j)
.
Definition 9 Consider a path q in T j and a subsidy assignment y on the edges of T j . We say that y is such
that subsidies are packed on the least crowded heavy edges of q if ya < cj for a heavy edge a implies that
ya′ = 0 for every heavy edge a′ of q with ma′ > ma.
We extend the notation of virtual cost so that vc(q, bj) denotes the sum of the virtual cost of the edges
of a path q in T j under the subsidy assignment bj . The following claim follows by the definitions and will
be very useful later.
Claim 10 Consider a path q and denote by q′ the set of heavy edges of q and a subsidy assignment y. If
∪a∈q′{ma} consists of the |q′| consecutive integers t−|q′|+1, t−|q′|+2, ..., t, then the virtual cost of path
q when subsidies are packed on its least crowded heavy edges is vc(q, y) = cj ln tt−|q′|+y(q)/cj .
Proof. Recall that the only edges that contribute to the virtual cost of q are the heavy edges in q′. If
y(q) = 0 (i.e., no subsidies are put on the edges of q′), the virtual cost is
vc(q, y) =
∑
a∈q′
vc(a, ya)
=
∑
a∈q′
cj ln
ma
ma − 1 + ya/cj
=
t∑
i=t−|q′|+1
cj ln
i
i− 1
= cj ln
t
t− |q′|+ y(q)/cj
.
The first two equalities follow by the definition of the virtual cost, the third one follows since ∪a∈q′{ma} =
{t− |q′|+ 1, t− |q′|+ 2, ..., t} and ya = 0, and the last one is obvious.
We now consider the case y(q) > 0. Since subsidies are packed on the least crowded heavy edges of q,
there must be a heavy edge a ∈ q′ such that ya > 0 so that ya′ = 0 for each heavy edge a′ with ma′ > ma
and ya′′ = cj for each heavy edge a′′ with ma′′ < ma. Let q′1 = {a′ ∈ q′ : ya′ = 0} and q′2 = q′\(q′1∪{a}).
Observe that the edges of q′2 and the light edges of q do not contribute to the virtual cost of q. Hence,
vc(q, y) =
∑
a′∈q′
1
vc(a′, ya′) + vc(a, ya)
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=
∑
a′∈q′
1
cj ln
ma′
ma′ − 1
+ cj ln
ma
ma − 1 + ya/cj
= cj
t∑
i=t−|q′
1
|+1
ln
i
i− 1
+ cj ln
t− |q′1|
t− |q′1| − 1 + ya/cj
= cj ln
t
t− |q′1| − 1 + ya/cj
= cj ln
t
t− |q′|+ y(q)/cj
The first two equalities follow by the definition of the virtual cost, the third one follows since the definition
of q′1 implies that ∪a′∈q′1{ma′} = {t− |q
′
1|+ 1, t− |q
′
1|+ 2, ..., t} and ma = t− |q′1|, the fourth equality is
obvious, and the last one follows since y(q) = ya + |q′2|cj and |q′| = |q′1|+ |q′2|+ 1.
Figure 4 provides a visualization of the virtual cost in a path when subsidies are packed on its less
crowded heavy edges.
q
ma1 = 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
packed subsidies
ma6 = 6
cj
cj
2
cj
3
cj/x
1.6
Figure 4: A visualization of the virtual cost in a path q, with 6 heavy edges and ∪a∈q{ma} = {1, 2, ..., 6},
when subsidies are packed on its less crowded edges. The leftmost edge and a fraction of 60% of the second
leftmost one have been subsidized. The virtual cost ln 61.6 (see Claim 10) is the area to the right of the dashed
line that is below the black line. The real cost experienced by the player associated with the far left node is
the area to the right of the dashed line that is below the grey line.
Now, we compute the subsidy assignment bj that assigns no subsidies to the light edges and subsidies to
the heavy edges of T j as follows. Denote by L the set of leaf-nodes of T j such that the path T ju connecting
such a leaf-node u to the root node r in T j contains at least one heavy edge. For each leaf-node u of L,
we pack subsidies to the least crowded heavy edges of T ju so that the virtual cost on the path T ju is exactly
cj . In particular, let S be the set of edges of T j defined as follows: a heavy edge (v, p(v)) belongs to S
if vc(T jp(v), 0) < cj and vc(T
j
v , 0) ≥ cj . Observe that the set S disconnects the leaves of L from the root
node. Indeed, if this was not the case, there would be a heavy edge that is used by exactly one heavy player
and is not assigned any subsidies; by the definition of the virtual cost, its virtual cost would be infinite. All
heavy edges that are on the side of the partition together with the root node are assigned zero subsidies; the
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heavy edges on the other side of the partition are assigned subsidies of cj and do not contribute to the virtual
cost of the paths they belong to. An edge a = (v, p(v)) of S is assigned subsidies bja with
bja = cj

1−ma

1− exp

vc(T jp(v), 0)
cj
− 1





 .
This definition implies that vc(T jp(v), 0) + vc(a, b
j
a) = cj . In this way, we guarantee that the virtual cost of
any path to the root node r is at most cj if it contains at least one heavy edge and zero otherwise.
We will now show that, given the subsidies we have assigned to the edges of T j , no player has an
incentive to deviate from her path to the root in T j . Consider the player associated with a node u and let qu
be another path from u to r in T j . Recall that the definition of subsidies and Claim 8 guarantees that the cost
experienced by the player that uses T ju is at most cj . Now, consider the edges of qu that do not belong to T
(since qu 6= T ju there is at least one such edge). If any such edge has weight cj , this means that, by deviating
to qu, the player associated with node u would experience a cost of at least cj and, hence, has no incentive
to do so. So, in the following we assume that the edges of qu that do not belong to T j have zero weight.
Now, consider the subgraph H of Gj induced by the edges in the paths T ju and qu. Let C be a cycle of H . It
consists of edges of T j and edges not belonging to T j that have zero weight. This implies that all edges in
C have zero weight, otherwise we could replace an edge of C that belongs to T j (and has non-zero weight)
with an edge of C that does not belong to T (which has zero weight) and obtain a spanning tree of Gj with
strictly smaller weight than T j . This contradicts the assumption that T j is a minimum spanning tree of Gj .
So, all edges of T ju that are contained in a cycle in H have zero weight. The remaining edges of T ju are also
used by qu. We conclude that the total cost experienced by the player associated with node u is the same no
matter whether she uses path T ju or qu and, hence, she has no incentive to deviate from path T ju to qu.
We will now show that the total amount of subsidies put on the edges of T j in this way is exactly
wgt(T j)/e. In order to show this, we will show that the total amount of subsidies put on the edges of T j
equals the total amount of subsidies put by the same procedure on the edges of another tree T¯ that consists
of a single path from the root that spans all the nodes and has the same number of heavy edges as the original
one. As an intermediate step, consider two edges g1 = (v1, p(v1)) and g2 = (v2, p(v2)) of S such that the
least common ancestor u of nodes v1 and v2 in T j has largest depth. We denote by h1 and h2 the number
of heavy edges in the subtrees of v1 and v2, respectively, and by q1 and q2 the paths connecting u to v1 and
v2 in T , respectively. Also, denote by q′1 (resp. q′2) the subset of q1 (resp. q2) consisting of heavy edges.
Assume that the virtual cost of the path in T j from r to u is ℓ for some ℓ ∈ [0, cj); then, the virtual cost of
the paths q1 and q2 is exactly cj − ℓ. Denote by bjg1 and b
j
g2 the subsidies assigned to edges g1 and g2 by the
above procedure, respectively. Since the edges g1 and g2 are selected so that their least common ancestor u
has largest depth, the edges in the path q1 are not used by any heavy player different than those in the subtree
of T j rooted at v1. Similarly, the edges in the path q2 are not used by any heavy player other than those in
the subtree of T j rooted at v2. Hence, both paths q1 and q2 satisfy the condition of Claim 10 above in the
sense that ∪a∈q′
1
{ma} = {h1 + 1, h1 + 2, ..., h1 + |q
′
1|} and ∪a∈q′2{ma} = {h2 + 1, h2 + 2, ..., h2 + |q
′
2|},
respectively. Hence, we can express the virtual cost of paths q1 and q2, respectively, as
vc(q1, b
j) = cj ln
h1 + |q
′
1|
h1 + b
j
g1/cj
= cj − ℓ
and
vc(q2, b
j) = cj ln
h2 + |q
′
2|
h2 + b
j
g2/cj
= cj − ℓ.
Equivalently, we have h1+ |q′1| = exp(1− ℓ/cj)(h1+ bjq1/cj) and h2+ |q
′
2| = exp(1− ℓ/cj)(h2+ b
j
g2/cj).
By summing these last two equalities, we obtain that h1 + h2 + |q′1| + |q′2| = exp(1 − ℓ/cj)(h1 + h2 +
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(bjg1 + b
j
g2)/cj) which implies
cj ln
h1 + h2 + |q
′
1|+ |q
′
2|
h1 + h2 + (b
j
g1 + b
j
g2)/cj
= cj − ℓ. (6)
Now, consider the following transformation of T j to another tree T ′. The only change is performed
in the paths q1, q2 and all subtrees of their nodes besides node u. We replace all these edges in T j with
a path q originating from u and spanning all the nodes in q1 and q2 and their subtrees so that exactly
h1 + h2 + |q
′
1| + |q
′
2| heavy edges are used. Let q′ be the set of heavy edges in q. We pack a total amount
cj(h1+h2)+b
j
g1+b
j
g2 of subsidies (i.e., the same total amount of subsidies used in the heavy edges of q1, q2
and in the subtrees of nodes v1 and v2 in T j) on the least crowded heavy edges of path q while the assignment
of subsidies on the other heavy edges of T ′ is the same as in the corresponding edges in T j . Now, the path
q satisfies the condition of the Claim 10 above in the sense that ∪a∈q′{ma} = {1, ..., h1 +h2+ |q′1|+ |q′2|}.
Hence, the virtual cost of path q when a total amount cj(h1 + h2) + bjg1 + b
j
g2 of subsidies is packed on
its least crowded heavy edges is the one at the left hand side of equality (6) and is exactly cj − ℓ while the
virtual cost of the path from the root to u in T ′ is not affected by our transformation (the number of heavy
players in the subtree of node u stays the same after the transformation) and is equal to ℓ. Hence, we have
transformed T j to T ′ so that the same total amount of subsidies is used and guarantees that any path from
the root to a node has virtual cost at most cj . By executing the same transformation in T ′ repeatedly, we
end up with a tree T¯ which consists of a path q¯ spanning all the nodes and has the same number of heavy
edges as the original tree T j (and, obviously, the same total weight). Let q¯′ be the set of heavy edges in q¯.
The transformation guarantees that by packing the original total amount of subsidies on the least crowded
heavy edges of q¯, we have that its virtual cost is exactly cj . Also, note that ∪a∈q¯′{ma} = {1, 2, ..., |q¯′|}
and, by Claim 10, the virtual cost of path q¯ when a total amount b(T j) of subsidies is packed on its least
crowded heavy edges is cj ln |q¯
′|cj
b(T j)
= cj . This implies that the total amount of subsidies in the original tree
is b(T j) = |q¯′|cj/e = wgt(T j)/e.
Now, for each copy Gj of G, we use the procedure in the proof of Lemma 7 to compute a subsidy
assignment bj so that the tree T j is an equilibrium for the extension of the broadcast game on the graph Gj
with subsidies bj . For the original game on the graph G, we assign an amount of ba =
∑k
j=1 b
j
a as subsidies
to edge a (i.e., equal to the total amount of subsidies assigned to a for each copy of G). We can easily show
that T is an equilibrium for the original broadcast game. Let Tu be the path used by the player associated
with node u in T and denote by qu a different path connecting u with r in G. The cost experienced by the
player associated with node u in T is
costu(T ; b) =
∑
a∈Tu
wa − ba
na(T )
=
∑
a∈Tu
k∑
j=1
wja − b
j
a
na(T j)
=
k∑
j=1
∑
a∈Tu
wja − b
j
a
na(T j)
≤
k∑
j=1
∑
a∈qu
wja − b
j
a
na(T j) + 1− nua(T
j)
=
∑
a∈qu
wa − ba
na(T−u, q′u)
= costu(T−u, qu; b),
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i.e., not larger than the cost she would experience by deviating to path qu, which implies that T is indeed
enforced as an equilibrium in the extension of the broadcast game on G with the particular subsidies. The
equalities follow by the definition of the cost experienced by the player associated with node u, or the
definition of our decomposition, or due to the exchange of sums, and the inequality follows since, by Lemma
7, T j is enforced as an equilibrium in the extension of the broadcast game in Gj with subsidies bj . The
bound on the amount of subsidies follows by the guarantee for the cost of the subsidy assignments bj from
Lemma 7 and the last property of our decomposition, and since the subsidy ba on each edge a is defined as
ba =
∑k
j=1 b
j
a.
We now present our lower bound.
Theorem 11 For every ǫ > 0, there exist a broadcast game on a graph G and a minimum spanning tree
T of G such that any subsidy assignment that enforces T as equilibrium of the extension of the broadcast
game with subsidies is at least (1/e − ǫ)wgt(T ).
Proof. Consider the graph G which consists of a cycle with n + 1 edges of unit weight that span the root
node r and the n nodes which are associated with the players. Let a = (r, u) be an edge incident to the
root node r and let T be the path that contains all edges of G besides a. Clearly, T is a minimum spanning
tree of G. Now, in order to satisfy that the player associated with node u has no incentive to deviate from
her strategy in T and use edge a instead, we have to put subsidies on some of the edges of the path T . The
maximum decrease in the cost of the player associated with node u is obtained when subsidies are packed
on the least crowded edges of T (i.e., on the edges of T that are further from the root); equivalently, the
minimum amount of subsidies necessary in order to decrease the cost of this player to 1 is obtained when
subsidies are packed on the least crowded edges of T . Let k be the number of edges that are subsidized. Since
the player associated with node u has no incentive to deviate, the cost of Hn−Hk she experiences at the n−k
edges on which we do not put subsidies is at most 1 while the total amount of subsidies is at least k−1. Using
the inequality x ≥ ln (1 + x) for x ≥ 0, we obtain 1 ≥ Hn −Hk =
∑n
t=k+1
1
t ≥
∑n
t=k+1 ln
t+1
t = ln
n+1
k+1
which implies that that the total amount of subsidies is at least k − 1 ≥ n+1e − 2. The weight of T is n and
the bound follows by selecting n to be sufficiently large.
5 All-or-nothing subsidies
In this section, we consider the all-or-nothing version of SNE. Interestingly, in contrast to the standard
version, we prove (Theorem 12) that its optimization version is hard to approximate within any factor.
Theorem 12 Given an instance of all-or-nothing STABLE NETWORK ENFORCEMENT consisting of a
broadcast game on a graph G and a minimum spanning tree T of G, approximating (within any factor)
the minimum cost over all-or-nothing subsidy assignments that enforce T as an equilibrium in the extension
of the broadcast game is NP-hard.
Proof. We use a reduction from instances of 3SAT-4 which consist of CNF formulas such that each clause
contains exactly three literals (corresponding to different variables) and each variable appears in at most
four clauses. Deciding whether such an instance has a truthful assignment or not is NP-hard [37]. Given
an instance φ of 3SAT-4 with a set of clauses C , our construction defines (in polynomial time) a broadcast
game on a graph G and identifies a particular minimum spanning tree T of G. Our construction uses a
parameter K which is significantly larger than 3|C|. We will show that deciding whether the minimum cost
over all-or-nothing subsidy assignments that enforce T as an equilibrium in the extension of the broadcast
game is at most 3|C| or at least K is NP-hard.
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First, we assign a label from {1, 2, ..., 9} to each variable in such a way that two variables that appear
in the same clause are assigned different labels. Due to the fact that each variable appears in at most four
clauses, it should have a different label than at most eight other variables. Hence, nine labels suffice and
the corresponding labeling can be computed in polynomial time. For j = 1, 2, ..., 9, we define the constants
nj =
1
428
29−j or, equivalently, for j = 1, 2, ..., 8, nj = 4n2j+1 with n9 = 7.
The graph G has a root-node r and consists of several gadgets: literal gadgets, clause gadgets, con-
sistency gadgets, and auxiliary nodes and edges. The non-root nodes of G are partitioned into critical and
non-critical ones. The edges of G belong to three different types: heavy edges of weight at least K , ultra
light edges of zero weight, and light edges of unit weight.
We start with the definition of the literal gadgets (see Figure 5). For each appearance of a literal ℓ in a
clause c, we have a literal gadget which consists of four non-critical nodes l(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ¯), u(c, ℓ) and v1(c, ℓ),
and the critical nodes v2(c, ℓ) and v3(c, ℓ). Let j denote the label of the variable corresponding to literal ℓ.
Then, there are the following edges: the light edges (l(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ¯)) and (u(c, ℓ¯), u(c, ℓ)), the heavy edges
(l(c, ℓ), v1(c, ℓ)), (v1(c, ℓ), v2(c, ℓ)), and (v3(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ)) of weight K , the heavy edge (l(c, ℓ), v3(c, ℓ)) of
weight K + 1nj−3 and the heavy edge (v2(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ)) of weight
3K
2 −
1
nj+1
. Among them, the first five
edges belong to T while the last two ones do not.
u(c, x¯)
v1(c, x) v2(c, x)
u(c, x)l(c, x)
v3(c, x)
K
K
K
K + 1
nj−3
3K
2
−
1
nj+1
Figure 5: The literal gadget for the appearance of literal x in clause c. The black nodes are the critical ones
and the solid edges are the ones that belong to T . The thick and thin solid edges are the heavy and light
ones, respectively.
For each clause c = (ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3) with literals corresponding to different variables with labels j1, j2, and
j3 with j1 < j2 < j3, we have a clause gadget (see Figure 6) which connects the three literal gadgets
corresponding to the appearance of literals ℓ1, ℓ2, and ℓ3 in clause c as follows. The node l(c, ℓ1) coincides
with the root-node r, the node l(c, ℓ2) coincides with node u(c, ℓ1), and the node l(c, ℓ3) coincides with
u(c, ℓ2). There is an extra critical node v(c) which is connected through a heavy edge of weight K to node
u(c, ℓ3) and through a heavy edge of weight K+ 1nj1 +
1
nj2−3
+ 1nj3−3
to the root-node r. Among these two
edges, the first one belongs to T while the second one does not.
Let c1, c2, c3, and c4 be the (at most) four clauses in which variable x appears. For each i = 1, 2, 3, we
have a consistency gadget that connects the two literal gadgets corresponding to the appearance of variable
x or its negation in clauses ci and ci+1. Let j be the label of variable x. We use two different consistency
gadgets depending on whether the variable appears as the same literal in both ci and ci+1 or not. An ℓ-ℓ
consistency gadget corresponds to the appearance of literal ℓ in clauses ci and ci+1 and consists of two
critical nodes u1(ci, ci+1, ℓ) and u2(ci, ci+1, ℓ). Node u1(ci, ci+1, ℓ) is connected through a heavy edge of
weight K to node u(ci, ℓ¯) of the literal gadget corresponding to the appearance of the literal ℓ in ci and
a heavy edge of weight K + 12nj to node u(ci+1, ℓ¯) of the literal gadget corresponding to the appearance
of literal ℓ in ci+1. Among these two edges, the first one belongs to T while the second one does not.
Node u2(ci, ci+1, ℓ) is connected through a heavy edge of weight K to node u(ci+1, ℓ¯) of the literal gadget
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u(c, x)
v1(c, x¯) v2(c, x¯)
u(c, x¯)
v3(c, x¯)
u(c, y¯)
v1(c, y) v2(c, y)
u(c, y)
v3(c, y)
u(c, z¯)
v1(c, z) v2(c, z)
u(c, z)
v3(c, z)
r
v(c)
K
K + 1
nj1
+ 1
nj2−3
+ 1
nj3−3
2− tc,x 2− tc,y¯ 2− tc,z¯
njx−njy−
7− tc,x¯
njy−njz−
7− tc,y
njz − 6 −
tc,z
Apex node
k
auxiliary gadget
Figure 6: The clause gadget for clause c = (x¯, y, z) along with the auxiliary nodes and edges. The auxiliary
gadget (shown in the right) indicates that k auxiliary nodes are connected to the apex node via ultra light
edges
.
corresponding to the appearance of the literal ℓ in ci+1 and a heavy edge of weight K + 12nj to node u(ci, ℓ¯)
of the literal gadget corresponding to the appearance of literal ℓ in ci. Among these two edges, the first
one belongs to T while the second one does not. An ℓ-ℓ¯ consistency gadget corresponds to the appearance
of literals ℓ and ℓ¯ in clauses ci and ci+1, respectively, and consists of two critical nodes u1(ci, ci+1, ℓ) and
u2(ci, ci+1, ℓ). Node u1(ci, ci+1, ℓ) is connected through a heavy edge of weight K to node u(ci, ℓ) of the
literal gadget corresponding to the appearance of the literal ℓ in ci and a heavy edge of weight K+ 1nj +
1
2n2
j
to node u(ci+1, ℓ) of the literal gadget corresponding to the appearance of literal ℓ¯ in ci+1. Among these two
edges, the first one belongs to T while the second one does not. Node u2(ci, ci+1, ℓ) is connected through
a heavy edge of weight K to node u(ci+1, ℓ) of the literal gadget corresponding to the appearance of the
literal ℓ¯ in ci+1 and a heavy edge of weight K to node u(ci, ℓ) of the literal gadget corresponding to the
appearance of literal ℓ in ci. Among these two edges, the first one belongs to T while the second one does
not. An example is depicted in Figure 7.
The last step in the construction is to include auxiliary non-critical nodes connected through ultra light
edges to nodes u(c, ℓ¯) and u(c, ℓ) for each clause c and each literal ℓ that appear in c. These edges belong
to T . The purpose of the auxiliary nodes and ultra light edges is to guarantee that for each appearance of
a variable of label j or its negation as a literal ℓ in a clause c, the number of players in T that use edges
(l(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ¯)) and (u(c, ℓ¯), u(c, ℓ)) is exactly nj and nj−3, respectively. This is done as follows. Consider
a clause c = (ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3) such that the literals ℓ1, ℓ2, and ℓ3 correspond to variables with labels j1, j2, and j3
with j1 < j2 < j3. For i = 1, 2, 3, let tc,ℓ¯i be the number of nodes in consistency gadgets to which node
u(c, ℓ¯i) is connected in T and observe that tc,ℓ¯i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We connect it to 2 − tc,ℓ¯i additional auxiliary
nodes through ultra light edges. Node u(c, ℓ3) is connected in T to node v(c), node v3(c, ℓ3), and to tc,ℓ3
nodes in the consistency gadgets it participates with tc,ℓ3 ∈ {0, 1}. We connect u(c, ℓ3) to nj3 − 6 − tc,ℓ3
additional auxiliary nodes through ultra light edges. For i = 1, 2, node u(c, ℓi) is connected in T to nodes
v3(c, ℓi), v1(c, ℓi+1), and to tc,ℓi nodes in the consistency gadgets it participates with tc,ℓi ∈ {0, 1}; we
connect it to nji − nji+1 − 7− tc,ℓi additional nodes through ultra light edges (see Figure 6).
In the following, we refer to players associated to non-critical nodes as non-critical players. All other
players are critical. The critical players associated with nodes v2(c, ℓ) and v3(c, ℓ) of a literal gadget corre-
sponding to the appearance of literal ℓ in clause c are called literal players. The critical players associated
with nodes u1(c1, c2, ℓ) and u2(c1, c2, ℓ) in consistency gadgets corresponding to the appearance of literal ℓ
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l(c1, x)
u(c1, x¯)
u(c1, x)
u1(c1, c2, x) u2(c1, c2, x)
l(c2, x) u(c2, x)
u(c2, x¯)
u1(c2, c3, x) u2(c2, c3, x)
u2(c3, cc, x¯)u1(c3, c4, x¯)
l(c4, x)
u(c4, x)
u(c4, x¯)
l(c3, x) u(c2, x¯)
u(c3, x)
K
K + 1
2nj
K + 1
2nj
K
K
K
K + 1
2nj
K + 1
2nj
K
K + 1
nj
+ 1
2n2
j K
K
Figure 7: Three consistency gadgets connecting literal gadgets associated to the appearance of literal x in
clause c1, literal x in clause c2, literal x¯ in clause c3, and literal x¯ in clause c4. The first and the third ones
are ℓ-ℓ consistency gadgets; the second one is an ℓ-ℓ¯ consistency gadget. Only nodes l(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ¯) and
u(c, ℓ) are shown in each literal gadget.
(or literals ℓ and ℓ¯) in clauses c1 and c2 are called consistency players. The critical player associated with
node v(c) in the clause gadget corresponding to clause c is called clause player.
Observe that our construction guarantees that T is connected, spans the nodes of G, and the number of
its edges is equal to the number of non-root nodes in G. Hence, it is indeed a tree. Also, note that it consists
of all light and ultra light edges and heavy edges of weight exactly K; the edges of G not included in T are
all heavy and, hence, T is a minimum spanning tree.
We have completed the description of our reduction. We use the term light assignment to refer to all-
or-nothing subsidy assignments that subsidize only light edges (clearly, ultra light edges do not need to be
subsidized). In the rest of the proof, we show that there exists a light assignment that enforces T as an
equilibrium in the extension of the broadcast game on G if and only if φ is satisfiable (Corollary 20). This
is done in a sequence of steps which can be briefly described as follows:
• Step 1. First, we observe that light assignments of subsidies guarantee that the non-critical players
have no incentive to deviate from their strategy in T (Lemma 13).
• Step 2. Then, we introduce the property of balance for light assignments which is proved to be
equivalent to the fact that the critical literal players do not have an incentive to deviate either; this is
done in Lemma 14 using the definition of the literal gadgets.
• Step 3. Then, we introduce the property of consistency for balanced light assignments which is proved
to be equivalent to the fact that the critical consistency players do not have an incentive to deviate
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either; this is done in Corollary 18 using the definition of the consistency gadgets. A nice effect of
this property is that there is a one-to-one and onto mapping between the consistent balanced light
assignments and the assignments of values to the variables of φ.
• Step 4. Finally, we introduce an additional property for consistent balanced light assignments that is
proved to be equivalent to the fact that the critical clause players do not have an incentive to deviate
either and, hence, T is enforced as an equilibrium in the broadcast game; this is done in Lemma 19
using the definition of the clause gadgets. A nice effect of this property is that the mapping mentioned
above is a one-to-one and onto mapping between the consistent balanced light assignments that satisfy
this property and the truthful assignments of φ.
We continue with Step 1.
Lemma 13 Consider the extension of the broadcast game on G with a light assignment of subsidies. Then,
no non-critical player has an incentive to change her strategy in T .
Proof. Consider a non-critical player whose strategy in T consists of light (and, possibly, ultra light) edges.
By the construction of T , this player may use light edges in at most three literal gadgets. Hence, the cost
she experiences is at most 6 while any deviation should include a heavy edge out of T .
Now consider the non-critical player associated with node v1(c, ℓ) in the literal gadget corresponding to
the appearance of literal ℓ in clause c. In her strategy in T , she uses the edge (v1(c, ℓ), l(c, ℓ)) (which is also
used by the player associated with node v2(c, ℓ)) as well as at most four light edges in at most two literal
gadgets. Hence, her cost is at most K/2+4. If she deviates to a strategy that contains edge (v1(c, ℓ), l(c, ℓ))
but not the path from l(c, ℓ) to r in T , she would experience a cost of at least 3K/2 > K/2 + 4 since, in
addition to edge (v1(c, ℓ), l(c, ℓ)), her strategy would include another heavy edge out of T used only by her.
Also, any deviation that contains the path 〈v1(c, ℓ), v2(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ)〉 would have cost at least 2K − 1nj+1 >
K/2 + 6, where j is the label of the variable corresponding to literal ℓ.
We proceed with Step 2. Consider a light assignment such that, for each clause c and each literal ℓ that
appears in c, exactly one among the light edges (l(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ¯)) and (u(c, ℓ¯), u(c, ℓ)) in the literal gadget
corresponding to the appearance of literal ℓ in clause c is subsidized; we call such an assignment a balanced
light assignment.
Lemma 14 Consider the extension of the broadcast game on G with a light assignment of subsidies. Then,
the critical literal players have no incentive to change their strategies in T if and only if the assignment is
balanced light.
Proof. Consider the literal gadget that corresponds to the appearance of a literal ℓ in a clause c. If none
of the two light edges of the gadget is subsidized, the critical literal player associated with node v3(c, ℓ)
has an incentive to deviate from her path 〈v3(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ¯), l(c, ℓ)〉 (where the cost she experiences is
K + 1nj−3 +
1
nj
) to the direct edge from v3(c, ℓ) to l(c, ℓ) (where the cost she would experience would be
K + 1nj−3 ). If both of the two light edges of the gadget are subsidized, the critical literal player associated
with node v2(c, ℓ) has an incentive to deviate from her path 〈v2(c, ℓ), v1(c, ℓ), l(c, ℓ)〉 (where the cost she
experiences is 3K/2) to the path 〈v2(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ¯), l(c, ℓ)〉 (where the cost she would experience
would be 3K2 −
1
nj+1
). If instead one of the edges (l(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ¯)) and (u(c, ℓ¯), u(c, ℓ) is subsidized, the
critical literal player associated with node v2(c, ℓ) experiences a cost of 3K/2 and has no incentive to change
her strategy to the path 〈v2(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ¯), l(c, ℓ)〉 (since her cost there would be at least 3K2 − 1nj+1 +
min{ 1nj+1 ,
1
nj−2
} ≥ 3K2 ). Also, the critical literal player associated with node v3(c, ℓ) experiences a cost of
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at most K +max{ 1nj−3 ,
1
nj
} and has no incentive to change her path from 〈v2(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ), u(c, ℓ¯), l(c, ℓ)〉
to the direct edge from v3(c, ℓ) to l(c, ℓ) (since her cost there would be K + 1nj−3 ≥ K +max{ 1nj−3 , 1nj }).
Also, note that if the critical literal player associated with node v2(c, ℓ) or v3(c, ℓ) deviates to a strategy that
does not use the path from node l(c, ℓ) to the root-node r in T , this would contain two heavy edges which
are used only by this player for a cost of at least 2K .
We proceed with Step 3 where our goal is to prove Corollary 18. This will follow by Lemmas 16 and
17. In their proof, we will use the following additional lemma.
Lemma 15 Consider the extension of the broadcast game on G with a balanced light assignment and a
literal gadget corresponding to the appearance of literal ℓ in clause c. Then, any player who uses or
deviates to a strategy that contains the path from node l(c, ℓ) to the root-node r in T experiences a cost of
at most 1
2n2
j
on the edges of this path, where j denotes the label of the variable corresponding to literal ℓ.
Proof. If j = 1, then our construction guarantees that l(c, ℓ) coincides with the root-node r. If j = 2, then
the path from l(c, ℓ) to the root-node r (if any) may contain the light edges of at most one literal gadget
corresponding to a variable with label 1, among which exactly one is subsidized since the assignment is
balanced light. Hence, a player that uses or deviates to a strategy that contains the path from node l(c, ℓ)
to the root-node r in T experiences a cost of at most 1n1−3 ≤
2
n1
= 1
2n2
2
. If j ≥ 3, then the path from
l(c, ℓ) to the root-node r (if any) may contain the light edges of at most two literal gadgets corresponding
to variables with labels at most j − 1 and j − 2; in each of these literal gadgets, exactly one among the
two light edges is subsidized since the assignment is balanced light. Hence, a player that uses or deviates
to a strategy that contains the path from node l(c, ℓ) to the root-node r in T experiences a cost of at most
1
nj−2−3
+ 1nj−1−3 ≤
2
nj−1
= 1
2n2
j
.
From now on, we will extensively use the following definition. For each literal ℓ, we define the set of
light edges
E(ℓ) =
{
(u(c, ℓ¯), u(c, ℓ)) : for each clause c that contains ℓ as literal
}
∪
{
(l(c, ℓ¯), u(c, ℓ)) : for each clause c that contains ℓ¯ as literal
}
Lemma 16 Consider the extension of the broadcast game on G with a balanced light assignment of subsi-
dies. Given an ℓ-ℓ consistency gadget for the appearance of literal ℓ in clauses c1 and c2, the following two
sentences are equivalent:
• The critical consistency players associated with nodes u1(c1, c2, ℓ) and u2(c1, c2, ℓ) have no incentive
to change their strategies in T .
• The light edges of the gadget that are subsidized are either those belonging to E(ℓ) or those belonging
to E(ℓ¯).
Proof. Consider an ℓ-ℓ consistency gadget that corresponds to the appearance of literal ℓ in clauses c1 and
c2. Let j be the label of the variable corresponding to literal ℓ. Since the assignment is balanced light,
two light edges are subsidized: one among the edges (l(c1, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ¯)) and (u(c1, ℓ¯), u(c1, ℓ)) of the literal
gadget corresponding to the appearance of literal ℓ in clause c1 and one among the edges (l(c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ¯))
and (u(c2, ℓ¯), u(c2, ℓ)) of the literal gadget corresponding to the appearance of literal ℓ in clause c2.
If the subsidized edges are (l(c1, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ¯)) and (u(c2, ℓ¯), u(c2, ℓ)), then the critical consistency player
associated with node u2(c1, c2, ℓ) has an incentive to change her strategy in T . The cost she experiences in
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her strategy in T is at least K+ 1nj . The cost she would experience by deviating to the strategy consisting of
path 〈u2(c1, c2, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ¯), l(c1, ℓ)〉 and the path from l(c1, ℓ) to r in T would be at most K + 12nj +
1
2n2
j
<
K + 1nj . In the left part of this inequality as well as in the inequalities below we have used Lemma 15 in
order to bound the cost experienced by the critical consistency player on the edges of the path from l(c1, ℓ)
to r in T .
If the subsidized edges are (u(c1, ℓ¯), u(c1, ℓ)) and (l(c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ¯)), then the critical consistency player
associated with node u1(c1, c2, ℓ) has an incentive to change her strategy in T ; due to symmetry, the argu-
ment is the same as above.
If the subsidized edges are the edges (l(c1, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ¯)) and (l(c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ¯)) that belong to set E(ℓ¯),
then no critical consistency player has an incentive to change her strategy in T . The critical consistency
player associated with node u1(c1, c2, ℓ) experiences a cost of at most K + 12n2
j
while the cost she would
experience by changing her strategy to the one that uses path 〈u1(c1, c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ¯)), l(c2, ℓ)〉 and the path
in T from l(c2, ℓ) to r would be at least K+ 12nj ≥ K+
1
2n2
j
. Also, note that if the critical consistency player
associated with node u1(c1, c2, ℓ) deviates to a strategy that does not use the path from node l(c1, ℓ) to the
root-node r in T , this would contain two heavy edges which are used only by this player for a cost of at least
2K . Due to symmetry, the argument for the critical consistency player associated with node u2(c1, c2, ℓ) is
the same.
If the subsidized edges are the edges (u(c1, ℓ¯), u(c1, ℓ)) and (u(c2, ℓ¯), u(c2, ℓ)) that belong to set E(ℓ),
then no critical consistency player has an incentive to change her strategy in T either. The critical consistency
player associated with node u1(c1, c2, ℓ) experiences a cost of at most K+ 1nj +
1
2n2
j
while the cost she would
experience by changing her strategy to the one that uses path 〈u1(c1, c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ¯)), l(c2, ℓ)〉 and the path
in T from l(c2, ℓ) to r would be at least K + 12nj +
1
nj+1
≥ K + 1nj +
1
2n2
j
. Also, note that if the critical
consistency player associated with node u2(c1, c2, ℓ) deviates to a strategy that does not use the path from
node l(c2, ℓ) to the root-node r in T , this would contain two heavy edges which are used only by this
player for a cost of at least 2K . Due to symmetry, the argument for the critical player associated with node
u2(c1, c2, ℓ) is the same.
Lemma 17 Consider the extension of the broadcast game on G with a balanced light assignment of sub-
sidies. Given an ℓ-ℓ¯ consistency gadget for the appearance of literals ℓ and ℓ¯ in clauses c1 and c2, the
following two sentences are equivalent:
• The critical consistency players associated with nodes u1(c1, c2, ℓ) and u2(c1, c2, ℓ) have no incentive
to change their strategies in T .
• The light edges of the gadget that are subsidized are either those belonging to E(ℓ) or those belonging
to E(ℓ¯).
Proof. Consider an ℓ-ℓ¯ consistency gadget that corresponds to the appearance of literals ℓ and ℓ¯ in the
clauses c1 and c2, respectively. Let j be the label of the variable corresponding to literals ℓ and ℓ¯. Since
the assignment is balanced light, two light edges are subsidized: one among the edges (l(c1, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ¯))
and (u(c1, ℓ¯), u(c1, ℓ)) of the literal gadget corresponding to the appearance of literal ℓ in clause c1 and
one among the edges (l(c2, ℓ¯), u(c2, ℓ)) and (u(c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ¯)) of the literal gadget corresponding to the
appearance of literal ℓ¯ in clause c2.
If the subsidized edges are (l(c1, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ¯)) and (l(c2, ℓ¯), u(c2, ℓ)), then the critical consistency player
associated with node u1(c1, c2, ℓ) has an incentive to change her strategy in T . The cost she experiences
in her strategy in T is at least K + 1nj−3 . The cost she would experience by deviating to the strategy
consisting of the path 〈u1(c1, c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ), l(c2, ℓ¯)〉 and the path from l(c2, ℓ¯) to r in T would be at most
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K + 1nj +
1
2n2
j
+ 1
2n2
j
< K + 1nj−3 . In the left part of this inequality as well as in the inequalities below we
have used Lemma 15 in order to bound the cost experienced by the critical consistency player on the edges
of the path from l(c1, ℓ) to r in T .
If the subsidized edges are (u(c1, ℓ¯), u(c1, ℓ)) and (u(c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ¯)), then the critical consistency player
associated with node u2(c1, c2, ℓ) has an incentive to change her strategy in T . The cost she experiences in
her strategy in T is at least K + 1nj . The cost she would experience by deviating to the strategy consisting
of the path 〈u2(c1, c2, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ¯), l(c1, ℓ)〉 and the path from l(c1, ℓ) to r in T would be at most
K + 1nj+1 +
1
2n2
j
< K + 1nj .
If the subsidized edges are the edges (l(c1, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ¯)) and (u(c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ¯)) of the set E(ℓ¯), then
no critical consistency player has an incentive to change her strategy in T . The critical consistency player
associated with node u2(c1, c2, ℓ) experiences a cost of at mostK+ 1nj +
1
2n2
j
. The cost she would experience
by deviating to the strategy consisting of the path 〈u2(c1, c2, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ¯), l(c1, ℓ)〉 and the path from
l(c1, ℓ) to r in T would be at least K + 1nj−2 ≥ K +
1
nj
+ 1
2n2
j
. Also, note that if the critical consistency
player associated with node u2(c1, c2, ℓ) deviates to a strategy that does not use the path from node l(c1, ℓ)
to the root-node r in T , this would contain two heavy edges which are used only by this player for a cost
of at least 2K . The critical consistency player associated with node u1(c1, c2, ℓ) experiences a cost of at
most K + 1nj−3 +
1
2n2
j
. The cost she would experience by deviating to the strategy consisting of the path
〈u1(c1, c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ), l(c2, ℓ¯)〉 and the path from l(c2, ℓ¯) to r in T would be at least K+ 1nj +
1
2n2
j
+ 1nj+1 ≥
K+ 1nj−3 +
1
2n2
j
. Also, note that if the critical consistency player associated with node u1(c1, c2, ℓ) deviates
to a strategy that does not use the path from node l(c2, ℓ¯) to the root-node r in T , this would contain two
heavy edges which are used only by this player for a cost of at least 2K .
If the subsidized edges are the edges (u(c1, ℓ¯), u(c1, ℓ))) and (l(c2, ℓ¯), u(c2, ℓ)), then no critical consis-
tency player has an incentive to change her strategy in T either. The critical consistency player associated
with node u2(c1, c2, ℓ) experiences a cost of at most K + 12n2
j
. The cost she would experience by deviating
to the strategy consisting of the path 〈u2(c1, c2, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ), u(c1, ℓ¯), l(c1, ℓ)〉 and the path from l(c1, ℓ) to r
in T would be at least K+ 1nj+1 ≥ K+
1
2n2
j
. Also, note that if the critical consistency player associated with
node u2(c1, c2, ℓ) deviates to a strategy that does not use the path from node l(c1, ℓ) to the root-node r in T ,
this would contain two heavy edges which are used only by this player for a cost of at least 2K . The critical
consistency player associated with node u1(c1, c2, ℓ) experiences a cost of at most K + 1nj +
1
2n2
j
. The cost
she would experience by deviating to the strategy consisting of the path 〈u1(c1, c2, ℓ), u(c2, ℓ), l(c2, ℓ¯)〉 and
the path from l(c2, ℓ¯) to r in T would be at least K + 1nj +
1
2n2
j
. Also, note that if the critical consistency
player associated with node u1(c1, c2, ℓ) deviates to a strategy that does not use the path from node l(c2, ℓ¯)
to the root-node r in T , this would contain two heavy edges which are used only by this player for a cost of
at least 2K .
We call a balanced light assignment such that for each variable x either the edges of E(x) or the edges
of E(x¯) are subsidized (i.e., if the second sentence in Lemmas 16 and 17 holds for every literal) a consistent
balanced light assignment. Under this definition, Lemmas 16 and 17 yield the following corollary.
Corollary 18 Consider the extension of the broadcast game on G with a balanced light assignment of
subsidies. The critical consistency players have no incentive to deviate from their strategy in T if and only
if the assignment is consistent balanced light.
Note that there exists a one-to-one and onto mapping between consistent balanced light assignments of
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subsidies and assignments of values to the variables of φ by setting x = 1 for every variable x such that the
edges in E(x) are subsidized (and x = 0 otherwise).
We proceed with Step 4.
Lemma 19 Consider a light assignment of subsidies. The following are equivalent:
• T is enforced as an equilibrium in the extension of the broadcast game.
• (a) The assignment of subsidies is consistent balanced light. (b) For each clause c = (ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3), at
least one of the following is true:
– the edges of E(ℓ1) are subsidized.
– the edges of E(ℓ2) are subsidized.
– the edges of E(ℓ3) are subsidized.
Proof. If T is enforced as an equilibrium, then no player has any incentive to deviate from her strategy
in T . By Lemma 14 and Corollary 18, we obtain (a). We will show that the fact that the critical clause
players have no incentive to deviate from their strategy in T implies (b). Assume otherwise that there exists
a clause c = (ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3) such that the edges in E(ℓ1) ∪ E(ℓ2) ∪ E(ℓ3) are not subsidized. This means that
the light edges (u(c, ℓ¯1), u(c, ℓ1)), (u(c, ℓ¯2), u(c, ℓ2)), and (u(c, ℓ¯3), u(c, ℓ3)) in the three literal gadgets
corresponding to the appearance of literals ℓ1, ℓ2, and ℓ3 in c are not subsidized. Let j1, j2, and j3 be
the labels of the variables corresponding to literals ℓ1, ℓ2, and ℓ3. Then, the cost the critical clause player
associated with node v(c) experiences on her strategy in T is at least K + 1nj1−3 +
1
nj2−3
+ 1nj3−3
. Hence,
she has an incentive to deviate and use the direct edge (v(c), r) of weight K + 1nj1 +
1
nj2−3
+ 1nj3−3
which
contradicts our assumption.
On the other hand, if (a) and (b) are true, we will show that no player has any incentive to deviate
from her strategy in T . Again, by Lemma 14 and Corollary 18, we have that (a) implies that critical literal
players and critical consistency players have no incentive to deviate while Lemma 13 implies that non-
critical players have no incentive to deviate. We will show that (b) implies that no critical clause player
has an incentive to deviate either. Indeed, consider a clause c = (ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3) and let j1, j2, and j3 be the
labels of the variables corresponding to literals ℓ1, ℓ2, and ℓ3. (b) implies that one among the three light
edges (u(c, ℓ¯i), u(c, ℓi)) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} in the three literal gadgets corresponding to the appearance of
literal ℓi is subsidized and, due to (a), if a light edge (u(c, ℓ¯i), u(c, ℓi)) is not subsidized, then the light edge
(l(c, ℓi), u(c, ℓ¯i) is subsidized. Hence, the cost of the critical clause player associated with node v(c) is at
most K+max
{
1
nj1
+ 1nj2−3
+ 1nj3−3
, 1nj1−3
+ 1nj2
+ 1nj3−3
, 1nj1−3
+ 1nj2−3
+ 1nj3
}
≤ K+ 1nj1
+ 1nj2−3
+
1
nj3−3
and, hence, this player has no incentive to use edge (v(c), r). Also, she has no incentive to deviate to
another strategy which includes edge (v(c), u(c, ℓ3)) but not the path from u(c, ℓ3) to r in T . Any such path
contains two heavy edges which would be used only by the critical clause player associated with node v(c)
and, hence, her cost would be at least 2K .
Note that the mapping mentioned above is a one-to-one and onto mapping between consistent balanced
light assignments of subsidies and truthful assignments of φ. We obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 20 There exists a light assignment of subsidies that enforces T as an equilibrium in the extension
of the broadcast game on G if and only if φ is satisfiable.
Hence, if φ is not satisfiable, then the minimum amount of all-or-nothing subsidies necessary to enforce
T as an equilibrium in the extension of the broadcast game is at least K (some heavy edge has to be
subsidized). We conclude that distinguishing between whether all-or-nothing subsidies of cost (at most)
27
3|C| are sufficient or subsidies of cost at least K are necessary in order to enforce T as an equilibrium in
the extension of the broadcast game is NP-hard. Theorem 12 follows by setting K to be arbitrarily large
compared to |C|.
Theorem 12 probably indicates that the only approximation guarantee we should hope for all-or-nothing
SNE is to bound the amount of subsidies as a constant fraction of the weight of an optimal design. The next
statement implies that significantly more subsidies may be necessary compared to the standard version of
SNE in order to enforce a minimum spanning tree as an equilibrium.
Theorem 21 For every ǫ > 0, there exist a broadcast game on a graph G and a minimum spanning tree T
of G such that the cost of any all-or-nothing subsidy assignment that enforces T as an equilibrium in the
extension of the broadcast game is at least
(
e
2e−1 − ǫ
)
wgt(T ).
Proof. We will define a graph G with n + 1 nodes which has a minimum spanning tree that consists of
a path 〈r, v1, v2, ..., vn〉. Let x = (n− n/e+ 1)−1. Edges (r, v1) and (vi, vi+1) for i = 1, ..., n − 2 have
weight x. Edge (vn−1, vn) has weight 1. The graph contains two additional edges: edge (r, vn−1) has
weight x and edge (r, vn) has weight 1. If we do not put subsidies on the edge (vn−1, vn), then we have to
put subsidies on each of the remaining edges in the path in order to guarantee that the player associated with
node vn has no incentive to use the direct edge (vn, r), i.e., a total amount of (n−1)x as subsidies. If we put
subsidies on the edge (vn−1, vn), we still have to guarantee that the player associated with node vn−1 has no
incentive to deviate to the direct edge (vn−1, r). Using the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 11,
we will need an amount of at least (n/e−2)x as subsidies on the edges of the path 〈r, v1, v2, ..., vn−1〉, for a
total of 1 + (n/e− 2)x. Due to the definition of x, we have that the amount of subsidies is at least n−1n−n/e+1
in both cases while the total weight of T is 2n−n/en−n/e+1 . The bound follows by selecting n to be sufficiently
large.
6 Open problems
Our work has revealed several open questions. Concerning the particular results obtained, it is interesting
to design a combinatorial algorithm for SNE which, on input a graph G and a minimum spanning tree T on
G, enforces T as an equilibrium on the corresponding broadcast game using minimum subsidies. Lemma 2
may be helpful in this direction. For the integral version of SNE, we have left open the question whether it
is always possible to enforce a given minimum spanning tree as an equilibrium in a broadcast game using
all-or-nothing subsidies of cost strictly smaller than the weight of a minimum spanning tree. Given our
negative result in Theorem 12, this is probably the only approximation that makes sense. It is tempting to
conjecture that our lower bound is tight, i.e., there is an algorithm that always uses a fraction of at most e2e−1
of the weight of the minimum spanning tree as subsidies in order to do so.
Approximating SND would also be interesting. Given the known hardness statements (e.g., [36]) or the
lack of positive results concerning the complexity of computing equilibria, this is a far more challenging
goal. A concrete question for SND instances consisting of broadcast games could be the following: can we
compute in polynomial time an equilibrium tree using subsidies of cost at most an α fraction of the weight
of the minimum spanning tree? Our results (Theorems 1 and 6) indicate that the answer is clearly positive
if α ≥ 1/e. Is this also possible if α is an arbitrarily small constant? Definitely, more general instances
of SND (e.g., involving multicast games) are challenging as well. Finally, variations of SNE and SND
that consider deviations of coalitions of players (as opposed to unilateral deviations), players with different
demands [1, 14], or different cost sharing protocols [15] deserve investigation.
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